Tw oexperiments examined the natureofrecognition memorybyasking how subjective reports of remembering change over time.InExperiment 1, participants wereasked to report their experience of remembering using the well-known remember-know-guess procedure. Estimates of recollection declined over a1 4-dayp eriod, but estimates of familiarity remained constant, suggesting that the processes arei ndependent. In Experiment 2, participants wereasked to report their confidence in their recognition decisions. Subjective reports of confidence werea nalysed via receiver operating characteristics and also indicated different rates of decline for recollection and familiarity.S uperficially,t he data appear to supportadual-process account of recognition, but close inspection shows the data to be consistent with as imple signal detection model. The conclusion is that although the phenomenal experience of remembering changes over time this is most likely to be predicated on asingle process.
Introduction
One way of defining memory is 'The length of time over which the recollection of a person or an umber of persons extends' (Simpson &W einer, 1989) . Clearly,t he persistence of memories depends, in part, on their strength, which may be determined by their salience, frequency of rehearsal, and amount of encoding (e.g. S lamecka & McElree, 1983) . But anecdote and introspection also tell us that the experience of remembering changes over time. For example, our experience of recognizing aperson we met in the recent pastt ends to be differentf rom the experience of remembering someone we met in the distant past. In the first case, we may recollect the person's name and other aspects of the meeting;i nt he second case, we may not be able to recollect who the personis, but afeeling of familiarity tells us that we have indeed met before. Changesi nt he experiences of recognition provideu sw ith an intuitively appealingmeans to examinethe architectureofepisodic memory.The aim of this paper is to show that while dissociationsinthe phenomenal experience of remembering such as these are relativelye asy to obtain experimentally,f ormal analyses using signal detection theoryd emonstrate that theyc an be predicated on as ingle underlying memoryp rocess rather than two.
Dual process models of recognition
Numerous studies point to the conclusion that recognition is composed of two processes: recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002) . According to the Yonelinas model, recollection is conceivedasathreshold process in which qualitative information regarding the contexto fe ncoding is retrieved. By contrast, familiarity involves an assessment of quantitative 'memorystrength' akin to signal detection. Recognition can be based on either recollection or familiarity,orb oth; although different models make slightly differenta ssumptions about this relationship. Because recollection and familiarity are assumed to encode different kinds of information and have different retrieval processes theya re characterized by distinct phenomenal states. Recollectionbased memory is characterized by ap henomenal sense of remembering in which episodic aspects of the study event, such as the context, are consciously re-experienced. By contrast,f amiliarity-based memoryi sc haracterized by ap henomenal sense of knowing whereby the person feels that an item was studied but does not re-experience any specific information about the study event -episodic aspects of the study event are either notstored or are unavailable to consciousness. It follows that subjective reports of the experienceofremembering can shed light on the architecture of human memory. To this end, Tulving (1985) developed an experimentalprocedure in which, at the point of retrieval, participants report their experience of remembering using two distinct categories. If their retrieval of the item also evoked aspects of the study episode then the participants wereinstructedtomake a remember response. If their retrieval gave rise to as ense of familiarity without evoking any aspects of the study episode then the participants were instructed to makeaknow response.
An umber of variables differentially affect remember and know responses that primaf acie suggest that these subjective reports of the phenomenal experience of remembering reflect distinct underlying memory processes. For example, deep levels of processing increase the proportions of remember responses but have no effect on know responses (Gardiner, 1988) . Dividing attention during the study episode impairs subsequent recollection but has no effect on familiarity (Gardiner &P arkin, 1990) . Manipulations of processing fluency at retrieval such as repetition primingo rt he revelation effect increase know responses but have no effect on remember responses (for ac omprehensive review,s ee Gardiner &R ichardson-Klavehn, 2000; LeCompte, 1995; Rajaram,1993 ; fora nalternative view,s ee Tunney&F ernie, 2007).
Howd oesthe experience of remembering changeo ver time?
An umber of studies have examined the effects of retention intervals on different memory processes. The majorityo ft hese have beenc oncerned with finding dissociations between implicit and explicitt ests such as priminga nd recognition (e.g. McBride &D osher,1 997; Tulving, Schacter,&Stark, 1982; Tunney, 2003) .T here arer elatively few experimental reportso fh ow thes ubjectivee xperienceo f remembering changes over time and what might be inferredf rom them about the underlying memoryp rocesses. In the first study of this kind, Tulving (1985) asked participants to reporttheir experiences of recognizing study words either immediately following the study period or 7d ays later.T ulving observedt hat the proportion of correct recognition responses reported as remembered was greater immediately following the study period than 7d ays later.I nt heir Experiment 1, Gardiner and Java (1991) reported arapid decline in rememberresponses over a1-week retention interval but littlechangeinthe proportion of know responses. In asecond experiment, Gardiner and Java measured remember and knowr esponses forr etention intervals of 1w eek, 4w eeks, and 6m onths.A fter these relativelyl ongr etentioni ntervals, theyo bserved similar rates of decline forb othr esponses. Knowltona nd Squire (1995) reported a similar experiment, but observed instead that the proportion of know responses actually increased over time. However,t heyu sed the samet est items after each retentioni nterval and this may have increased the familiarity of each item (see also Hockley &C onsoli, 1999) .I fo ne assumes, as these authorsd o, that the remember responses areameasure of recollection and know responses are ameasure of familiarity, then these differences in the rates of forgetting over these retention intervals provide evidence that the two underlying processes are independent and dissociable.
1.3. Single-process accounto fr emembering and knowing Evidence that dissociations between recollection and familiarity based on subjective reports of remembering and knowing is not universally accepted. Insteadamodified signal detection model could, in principle, provide am ore parsimonious theory (Donaldson, 1996; Hirshman &Master,1997; Wixted &Stretch, 2004) .According to this model (shown in Figure 1 ), bothrecollection and familiarity are predicated on asingle process in which old and new items varya ccording to some dimensions uch as quantitative memorystrengthrather than qualitativelydifferentprocesses. Participants set ac riterion and any items whose memorys trengthe xceeds that criteriona re endorsed as old, while those that fall below the criterion are rejecteda sn ew.Because participants are instructed to makea dditional decisions about their subjective experience of remembering theym ust set additional criteria to reflect this. Items that exceed the remember criterion are reported as rememberresponses, and those that fall shortb ut nonethelesse xceed the old-neworg uessing criterion are reported as know responses. Thus,a ccording to this univariate signal detectionm odel,t he subjective experience of recollection merely reflects aphenomenal stateo fh igh familiarity.
This model makes ak ey prediction that estimates of sensitivitys hould be closely related irrespective of whether theya re based on old-new judgements or remember responses. Thisisbecause estimates of sensitivitythat are designed to be independent of criteria or responseb ias measure the distance between the olda nd new distributions. So if the estimate of sensitivity based on the 'old' responses is close to the estimate based on rememberresponses, we can conclude that recollection merely reflectsquantitative memorys trength, that is, familiarity alone; or at least that as eparate process of recollection is not required to account fort he patternofr esults. On the other hand, if theyd on ot match, we would be forced to attribute the rememberr esponses to an additional source of information,s uch as an independent recollection process,t hat is not accommodated by this model. Donaldson (1996) applied this model to 80 published experiments that used the remember-know procedure. The findings werec onsistent with the univariate signaldetectionmodel in that the estimates of sensitivity based on remember responses wereclosely related to estimates based on 'old'responses (see also Dunn, 2004; Wixted &S tretch, 2004) .
Donaldson'sc onclusions were challengedi nitiallyb yG ardiner, Ramponi,a nd Richardson-Klavehn (2002) , and more recently by Macmillan, Rotello, and Verde (2005) . Gardiner et al. 's (2002) challenge wasb ased on am eta-analysis of 86 experimental conditions (from 23 separate experiments,many of which were unpublished) that used an additional responseoption of guessing.The inclusion of the guess response wasan important advance in methodologybecause if aparticipant feelsthat theyare guessing but guessing is notar esponseo ption then the effect is to erroneously inflate the estimate of familiarity (seeT unney&Fernie, 2007) . Gardiner et al. (2002) arguedt hat when guessing is available as aresponse option Donaldson's(1996) test of the univariate signal detection model fails, and the data supportthe dual-process account. Macmillan et al. (2005) questioned both results on the basis that theywerebased on the statistic A 0 as the measure of sensitivity (Pollack &Norman, 1964) and B
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D as the measure of bias (Donaldson, 1992) .T he measure of sensitivity A 0 is an estimate of the triangular area under the one-point receiveroperating characteristic (ROC) curve.Itispopular because it can be regarded as an approximation of what the proportion correct in ay es-no experiment would have been if it were atwo-alternative forced-choice experiment; that is, without the bias inherent in an old-new design as is the case with proportion correct when there are equaln umberso fo ld and new test items chance A 0 ¼ 0.5 and perfect discrimination A 0 ¼ 1. These measures are also popular because theyw ere originally, albeite rroneously,i ntroduced as non-parametric measures ( Donaldson, 1992; Macmillan &C reelman, 1991; Pollack &N orman, 1964) on the basis that theya ssume uniformdistributions.Bycontrast, the measure of sensitivity d 0 and bias c bothassume normal underlying distributions.T he statistic d 0 is literally the distance between the standardized old and new distributions. Macmillan et al. (2005) showed that when used to analyse subjective reportso fr emembering the two measures of sensitivityg ive contradictoryr esults because theym ake different assumptions about the underlying signal and noise distributions.I np articular,M acmillan et al. (2005) arguet hat the assumptions made by the use of A 0 are wrong and inferences made on the basis of its use flawed. While the details of this argument are beyond the scope of this paper,t he conclusion is relevant: neither Donaldson's( 1996) nor Gardiner et al. 's (2002) contradictoryfi ndings discriminate between signald etection and dual-process models of recognition.
Subjective reports of confidence
Signal detection theoryalso provides ameans to discriminate between single-and dualprocess models of recognitionmemoryb ya nalysis of subjective reports of confidence (Yonelinas, 1994) .Inthis framework, participants are asked to reporttheir confidence (on an umeric scale) in each recognition decision. These are thenu sed to construct multiple-point ROCc urves that plot hit rates against false-alarmr ates fore ach level of confidence. Forexample, after studying alist of items, participants are presented with a mixture of old and new items and are required to make recognition judgements on a confidences cale from surei tw as old to surei tw as new.T he number of different responsecategories on the scale typically ranges from 6to10. Alternatively, participants can use percentagec ategories, where 50% representsaguess and 100% represents certainty. Points on the ROCare then plotted as afunction of confidence, such that the first point includes only the most confidently remembered items (100% sure),t he secondp oint includes all of the most confident responses as well as the next most confident responses (100% sure þ 90% sure),and so on until all the responses are used. Figure 2showsthree hypothetical ROCcurvesand the underlying distributions that can be inferred from them. The coordinates plottedo nt he ROCc urvesa re z transformations of the cumulative hit and false-alarmrates. The slope of the standardized regression coefficient ( b )t hrough the z -transformed coordinates is am easure of the symmetryoft he ROCc urve and can be used to makeinferences about the underlying memoryprocesses. Figure 2a shows asymmetrical z ROCwith aslope of 1. Symmetrical ROCc urvesa re perfectlyd escribed by as imple univariate signald etectionm odel of memory (Green &Swets, 1966) in which recognition is based entirely on the familiarity of the item and items are endorsed as old (i.e.r ecognized) if theye xceed the participants'r esponsec riterion. Thisf ormo fR OC curve would result from the distributions shown in Figures 1a nd 2b. Figures 2c and 2d show asymmetrical z ROCs with slopes less than 1. These asymmetries can arise either from unequal signal and noise distributions (Figure2d) or from proportionately more high-confidence hits than high-confidence false alarms ( Figure 2f ). As such, the first case does necessarily provide evidence forthe dual-process process model. The second case, however,isassumed by many dual-process theorists to occur when recognition decisions are influenced by both recollection and familiarity.This is because recollection as athreshold process distorts the linearity of the z ROC. Thus a z ROCw ith slopes less than 1m ust be asymmetric if theya re the result of two processes with differentr etrieval characteristics (Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, &A dams, 1999) . It follows that the critical test of whether two components are actually present is whether the regression through the z coordinates shows areliable quadratic component, as shown in Figure 2e . In this case, the effect may be considered as evidence fort wo separate processes if it is assumed that the high-confidence hits reflect recollection in addition to the standard familiarity-based model. On the other hand, if therei sn oq uadratic component, but the linear slope is reliably less than 1, as shown in Figure 2d , then the effect may be attributedtounequal variances in the underlying signal-to-noised istribution, rather than an additional recollection process (Arndt &R eder,2 002; Diana, Reder,A rndt, &P ark, 2006; Lotz & Kinder, 2006; Y onelinas, 1994) . Agrowing number of studies have closely examined the source of asymmetryinROC curves forr ecognition judgements to determine whether theyd oi ndeed indicate dual processes (Glanzer et al.,1 999; Smith &D uncan,2 004).F or example, Glanzer et al. (1999) reported four experiments, and re-examined 33 earlier ones, in which variables thought to influence the relative contribution of recollection to recognition decisions were assessed via ROCcurves. Thesevariables are similar to those previously reviewed by Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000) with respect to estimates of recollection derived from remember-know judgements, such as list length, repetition, word frequency,a nd concreteness. Glanzer et al. (1999) observed that while the overwhelming majority show asymmetryi nt he sense of having reliable slopes less than 1, veryfew show reliable quadratic components. Theyconclude that 'recollection, as indicated by positive quadratic constants in the ROC, is not ageneral characteristicof recognition. It may however,o ccur under some conditions' (Glanzer et al., 1 999, p. 512) . There remains the possibility that one such condition might be lengthened retentioni ntervals, since this variable is plausible, but has not yet been examined. Twoe arlier reports have examined the effects of retention intervals on ROCc urves. Both of these demonstrated changes in the symmetryofthe z ROCs over time. However, one used non-word stimuli and so is not directly comparable (Tunney&Bezzina, 2007) . The other (Wais, Wixted,H opkins,&Squire, 2006) didn ot test foraquadratic component, so it is not clear if the z ROCb ecame morec urvilineara st he slope decreased with shorterretention intervals (as the dual-process model requires). Thisis one of the questions we set out to answer.
Overview of experiments
If both theR OC andt he remember-know method accurately reflect dual processes involved in recognitionmemorythenthere should be adegreeofcorrespondence between them.Itfollows that theeffects of retentionintervals observed on estimatesofrecollection andfamiliarityderived from subjective reports of rememberingshouldalsobeobservedon estimatesd erivedf roms ubjectiver eports of confidence. In thet wo experiments that follow,participantsfirststudied alistofEnglish nounsand were givenrecognition testsfor different subsetsofthe studyitems (tominimizeany interference effects) afterretention intervalsof15minutes,7days,and 14 days.InExperiment1,participantsreportedtheir experienceofremembering usingremember, know,and guessresponses.Previousstudies omittedt he guessing option andm ay thereforeh avei nflated thee stimates of familiarity (Gardiner&Java,1991; Knowlton &Squire, 1995) . In Experiment2,participantsreported theire xperienceofremembering usingconfidence ratings. Dual-processtheorypredicts that recollection will decliner apidly relative to familiarity. In Experiment1 ,t hiswillb e reflected as alargerdecline in remember responses than know responsesoverthe course of theexperiment. In Experiment2,the declineinrecollectionwillbereflectedinchanges to thesymmetryofthe z ROCcurves. We will then attempttofitthe univariatesignaldetection modeltothese data.InExperiment1,wewilltest thepredictionmadebyDonaldson (1996) that estimatesofsensitivity based on 'old'responses arec losely relatedt ot hose basedo n remember responses. We will also test thep redictionm adeb yR otello,M acmillan,a nd Reeder (2004) that thes lope of z ROCc urvesd erived from subjective reports of rememberingi nE xperiment1ares imilar in form to thoseo btainedf romc onfidence ratingsi nE xperiment2 .I nE xperiment2 ,w ew illt estt he asymmetryo ft he z ROCf or aq uadratic componentt od etermine if it is duet os eparatep rocesses of recollection andf amiliarityo rd ue to unequald istributions.T he dual-process modelr equirest hat the z ROCi sb otha symmetrica nd hasareliable quadraticc omponentw hen recollection contributes to recognitiond ecisions.I tf ollows that as retention intervals become longer andr ecollectiond eclines, thes lope of the z ROCs houldi ncrease towards1and should be mirroredbyadecliningquadratic component. If,onthe other hand,t here is no quadraticc omponent or change in them agnitude of thec omponent then we canc oncludet hata ny asymmetries in the z ROCs ared ue to changesi nt he varianceso ft he signal andn oise distributions andn ot duet oarecollective process.
2. EXPERIMENT 1 2.1. Method 2.1.1. Participants Twenty-four members of the University of Nottingham communityvolunteered to take partinthis experiment. Nineteen were female and fivewere male. Their mean agewas 21.8 years.
Stimuli
There were two study lists and six test lists. Each study list consisted of 90 different English nounso btained from the MRCP sycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) . These werec ontrolled forw ord length (5-7 letters), familiarity (400-700), and concreteness (400-700). Eachtest list was composed of 30 of the words from the study lists. Fore xample, List 1A was composed of one-third of the List Aw ords, List 2A of another third,a nd List 3A of the remainder.T he test listsw ere counterbalanced such that forh alf the participants Ai tems were olda nd Bi tems were new,a nd fort he remainderBitems were new and Ai tems old.
Design and procedure
This was arepeated-measures design with an initial study session and three test sessions. In the study session, the participants were askedt om emorize either List Ao rB .E ach word appearedo ne at at ime in the centre of ac omputer screen for3s. Immediately after the study session, participants were presented with the first recognition test consisting of List 1A and 1B items. Each word appeared one at atime in the centre of the computer screen. Participants clicked ab utton marked 'old' if theyt hought the word was one that theyh ad memorized earlier or 'new' if theyt hought theyh ad not.I ft he responsewas 'old' participants were asked to reporttheir experience of remembering by clicking one of three buttons marked 'remember', 'know', or 'guess'. The descriptions of remember, know, and guess responses were modifiedfrom the standard instructions detailed in Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000) . To check that participants understoodthe instructions relatingtosubjective reports, theywere asked to explain to the experimenter how theyw ould use the response options available to them. This resulted in as hortr etention interval of about 10 min between the study phase and the initial test phase.P articipants were asked to returnf or as econd test session7daysl ater,a nd again after another 7d ays. The second session tested recognition forLists 2A and 2B, and the third sessiontested Lists 3A and 3B.Bythe time of the third test session,1 4d ays hade lapsed since participants first memorized the words contained in those test lists.
Results

Recognition
The proportions of correct recognition responses, hits, and false alarms are shownf or each retention interval in Table 1 . The proportion of correct responses shows areliable declineo ver the three sessions, F ð 2 ; 46Þ¼92: 15,M SE , 0 : 01, p , : 01, h 2 p ¼ : 80, indicating areliable drop in performance over the 14-day period.
1
There was asignificant fall in accuracy over the first 7-day retention interval, t ð 23Þ¼9 : 67, SD ¼ 0 : 10, p , : 01, but no furtherdecline between 7and 14 days, t ð 23Þ¼1 : 32, SD ¼ 0 : 08, p , : 20.
Experience of remembering
The proportions of correct remember and know responsesf or each retention interval are shown in Figure 3a . Thesedata were entered into a2 £ 3ANOVA with response and retentioni nterval as within-subjects factors. There was an effect of retention interval, F ð 1 : 48; 34: 07Þ¼48: 32, MSE , 0 : 01, p , : 01, h 2 p ¼ : 68, no effect of response, Estimates of familiarity based on the assumption of exclusivity (familiarity ¼ p ð knowÞ ) yielded ac ounter-intuitive result in that familiarity appeared to increase over time, F ð 2 ; 46Þ¼8 : 70, MSE , 0 : 01, p , : 01, h 2 p ¼ : 28. There was asignificant increase in the proportion of know responses after the first 7days, t ð 23Þ¼2 3 : 50, SD ¼ 0 : 13, p , : 01, but no changebetween 7and 14 days, t ð 23Þ , 1. This patternmight have been expected if the samet est items wereu sed on each occasion as in the experiment reported by Knowlton and Squire (1995) . However,inthis case adifferent set of items were used on each occasion and no model of either forgetting or memory predicts an increase in memorystrengthover time in these circumstances. Alternatively,this effect might arise by treating the proportion of know responses as apure measure of familiarity.Instead it has becomecommon practice to treat the know responses as independent of remember responses (Yonelinas &Jacoby,1995) .That is, because participants are askedtorespond 'know' whenever an item feelsfamiliar withoutany experience of recollection, Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995) suggested that familiarity is best estimated as the proportion of know responses given the item wasn ot reported as ar ememberr esponse (i.e. familiarity ¼ p ð knowÞ = ð 1 2 p ð rememberÞ ). There wasn os uch increase in the estimate of familiarity when the estimates were adjusted to make this assumption of independence, F ð 1 : 31; 30: 13Þ¼2 : 60,MSE , 0 : 02, p ¼ : 11, h 2 p ¼ : 10 (seeFigure 3b). The results of Experiment 1a re consistent with previouss imilar experiments and appear to show that recollection declines rapidly relative to familiarity.Y onelinas (2002) commented that the apparent persistence of familiarity could, in some circumstances, be due to afl oor effect.H owever,t he higherr ate of know responses, relative to guess responses, rules this out. Thesedata could be interpreted as adissociation between two separate memoryp rocesses. Before we examine this interpretation in more detail, Experiment 2will obtain estimates of recollection and familiarity by means of confidence ratings using the sameitems and the sameretention intervals as Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2w as identical to Experiment 1w ith the exception that estimates of familiarity and recollection were based on confidence ratings rathert han subjective reports of the experience of remembering. If the initial period of relativelyh igh recognition is due to the contribution of bothrecollection and familiarity then the ROC curves derived from confidence ratings madea fters hortr etentioni ntervals should be asymmetric. As recollection declines, the symmetryo ft hese ROCc urves should increase. The aim is to obtain as imilar patterno fr esults to Experiment 1u sing a different technique to estimate the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity before testing the dual-process interpretation of bothe xperiments.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four memberso ft he University of Nottingham communityv olunteered to take partinthis study.T welvewere male and twelvewere female. Theirmean agewas 22.3 years.
Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1e xceptt hat whenever participants endorsed an item as old theywere askedtoreporthow confident theywereonascale ranging from 0to9 ,where 0 ¼ 'veryu nsure'and 9 ¼ 'absolutely sure'.
Results
Recognition
The proportions of correct responses, hits, and false alarms are shown in Table 2 . The decreasei np roportion correct wasr eliable, F ð 2 ; 46Þ¼96: 72, MSE , 0 : 01, p , : 01, h 2 p ¼ : 81. The drop in performance from 0t o7daysw as reliable, t ð 23Þ¼9 : 17, SD ¼ 0 : 11, p , : 01. The drop in performance from 7t o1 4d ays was only marginally significant, t ð 23Þ¼2 : 03, SD ¼ 0 : 09, p ¼ : 05.
Receiver operating characteristics
The mean slope parametersfor each retention interval are shown in Table 2 . The z ROCs are shown in Figure 4 . The operation of two processes is indicated by an asymmetric ROCcurve measured by the slope ( b )ofthe z ROC. If time affects recollectionmorethan familiarity then the slope of the curve should initially be less than 1( as the curve is asymmetric) and approach 1a sr ecollection declines. The slope parametersw ere obtained individually fore ach participant on the basis of their cumulative z (hits) and z (false alarm) rates. The lines fitted represent the averaged coordinates. The mean slopes ( b )o btained after each retention interval werea ll reliably differentf rom 1, indicating that recollection contributed to recognition decisions even after2weeks (immediatet est: t ð 23Þ¼2 10: 72, SD ¼ 0 : 26, p , : 01; 7d ays: t ð 23Þ¼2 3 : 84, SD ¼ 0 : 27, p , : 01; 14 days: t ð 23Þ¼2 3 : 14, SD ¼ 0 : 31, p , : 01).T he decline from 0t o7days wass ignificant, t ð 23Þ¼2 5 : 23, SD ¼ 0 : 34, p , : 01. There wasn of urther significant decline from 7t o1 4d ays, t , 1 : 0. Thesed ata show the same patterno f declineasE xperiment 1.
Te sts of the univariate signal detection model
The data obtained in the two experiments reported hereappear to be consistent with the dual-process model of recognition. Nonetheless,this model is subjecttoagreat deal of controversya st here are theorists who believe that some form of signal detection model provides amore parsimonious description of recognition memory than the dualprocess account. The univariate signal detectionm odel of remembering and knowing shown in Figure 1makes anumber of testable predictions regarding the data obtained in Experiment 1. First, Donaldson (1996) argued that estimates of sensitivityderived from 'old' responsesand from rememberresponses will be closely related since estimates of sensitivitya re independent of criterion placement. If theya re poorly related or unrelated, we would conclude that remember responses are predicated on an additional source of memorys uch as recollection that is not encapsulated in the single-process model (Gardiner et al.,2002) . Both Donaldson (1996) and Gardiner et al. (2002) used A 0 as their measure of sensitivity. The estimates of sensitivityd erived from 'old' responses and from remember responses fore ach retentioni nterval are showni nT able 1. Figure 5a shows the relationship between estimates of sensitivity ( A 0 )derived from 'old'responses and from remember responses. Overall, these werer eliably correlated ( r ¼ .75, p , .01) and therefore consistent with the predictionmadeb yt he single-process model. Macmillan et al. (2005) Figure 5b shows the relationship between d 0 derived from 'old' responses and from rememberr esponses fore ach retention interval. Thesew ere also reliably correlated ( r ¼ : 83, p , : 01).B oth kinds of estimate point to the same conclusion and supportt he univariate signaldetection model.
Asecond prediction made by the univariate model is that if remembering and knowing reflect quantitative memorystrengthinthe sameway that confidence ratings are thought to, thenthe slope of the z ROCb ased on subjective reportso fr emembering should be closely related to the slope of the z ROCbased on confidenceratings Rotello et al.,2004) . Any data that show that the z ROCslopes derived from the two kinds of reporta re differentm ay be evidence against the univariate account. In their reanalysis of Gardiner et al. 's (2002) meta-analysis Macmillan et al. reported that the averageslope of the z ROCbased on subjective reports of remembering did indeeddiffer from the slopes obtained from confidence ratings. The directiono ft he difference depended on whether guessing was available as aresponseoption.
The test of this prediction requires ac omparison between Experiments 1a nd 2. Figure 6s hows the ROCs derived from subjective reportso fr emembering in Experiment 1. To test this prediction, the mean slopes ( b )ofthe z ROCcurvesobtained in Experiments 1and 2were entered into amixed-model ANOVA with experiment as a between-subjects factor and retention interval as the within-subjects factor. There was an effect of retention interval ( F ð 2 ; 92Þ¼19: 75, MSE ¼ 0.11, p , .01, h 2 p ¼ : 30) indicating that the symmetryo ft he slopes changed over time. There was no effect of experiment ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ , 1 : 0, MSE ¼ 0 : 11, p . : 05, h 2 p ¼ : 05) indicating that the slopes were identical in each experiment; nor an interaction between the two ( F ð 2 ; 92Þ , 1 : 0, MSE , 0 : 01, p ¼ : 11, h 2 p ¼ : 01) indicating that the rate of symmetryc hangei ne ach experiment was the same. The signaldetection model requires that the slopes derived from subjective reportso fr emembering be essentiallyt he samea st hose derived from confidenceratings since theyare assumed to reflect the same underlying variable. Any other patternw ould be inconsistent with the univariate signald etectionm odel but might be accommodated by the dual-process account.
Nonetheless,t he averages lopes obtained from reportso fr emembering are numerically larger (closer to 1) than those obtained from confidence ratings at each retentioninterval. This is actually adifferentpatternthan reported by Macmillan et al. (2005) w ho observedt hat when guessing was ar esponseo ption the slopes for confidencerating were higherthan forreports of remembering. Multiple uncontrolled comparisons between experiments at each retentioni nterval confirmt hat these numeric differences do not reach the criterion fors tatistical significance (0 days: t ð 46Þ¼1 : 20, p ¼ : 24; 7d ays: t ð 46Þ¼0 : 14, p ¼ : 87; 14 days: t ð 46Þ¼1 : 45, p ¼ : 15). Thus, the patterno fd ata in Experiment 1i sa lso consistent with the single process account of remembering and knowing shown in Figure 1 .
Differences in the slopes of the z ROCd erived from each method may well result from the variability of the criterion placement forr ememberr esponses (Starns & Ratcliff, 2008; Wixted &Stretch, 2004 ). Previous experiments have tested this by asking participants to make subjective reports of remembering and confidence in withinsubjects designs and then comparing the distributionso fr emember and know responses at different levels of confidence. Theses how that remember responses are frequently given at lower levels of confidence than know responses (Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder,&Wong, 2005; Wixted &S tretch, 2004) .M oreover,an umber of experiments have shownt hat manipulations designed to induce liberal or conservative responding result in criterions hifts fort he rememberr esponse (e.g.R otello, Macmillan, Hicks, & Hautus, 2006) . It follows that even in cases wheres lope estimates differ between methodst hese may result from differences in the instructions given to participants rather than differences in underlying processes (Dunn, 2008) . That is, participants are used to making confidence judgements in many different scenariosa nd might be well calibrated in their criteria placement, but theyare likely to have little or no experience of making remember or know judgements and so be more variable in the placement of their criteria. If criterions hifts were responsible forc hangesi nt he estimate of recollection in Experiment 1then we would expect that the initially high estimates of recollection (0 days) would be associated with relativelyl iberal criterion relative to the longer retention intervals. On the other hand,i ft he estimates of recollection are predicated on the relative decline in recollection then the criterion form aking a remember responseshould remain constantdespite the reducing sensitivity.Infact, the estimates of bias ( c )b ased on the proportions of correct and incorrect remember responses were smaller (i.e. more liberal) immediately following the study period than after 7a nd 14 days (0 days: c ¼ 0 : 83, SE ¼ 0 : 07; 7d ays: c ¼ 1 : 34, SE ¼ 0 : 10; 14 days c ¼ 1 : 40, SE ¼ 0 : 10).T he participants were more willingt or eport endorsementsa s remember responses immediately following the study than 7d aysl ater ( t ð 23Þ¼5 : 21, p , : 01). There wasn oc hangeb etween 7a nd 14 days ( t ð 23Þ , 1 : 0).
The final criterion by which we will assess the univariate signal detectionand dualprocess modelsisthe precise form of the z ROCcurves. Consider the threehypothetical z ROCcurves shown in Figure 2 . The data from Experiments 1and 2donot match the patternpredicted by the equal-variance signaldetection model (Figures 2a and 2b ) since the slope of the z ROCi ne ach case deviatesf rom 1. We can, therefore, exclude this model as an explanation of these data. However,the equal-and unequal-variance models are both univariate signal detection models. The dual-process model predicts adegree of curvatureonthe z ROCasaresult of the proportion of high-confidencehits. This can be estimated via aq uadratic regression component that differs from 0 ( Arndt &R eder, 2002; Diana et al.,2 006; Lotz&Kinder,2 006; Yonelinas,1 994) .T he unequal-variance signal detection model predicts no quadratic component. To test between the unequalvariance signal detection model (Figures 2c and 2d ) and the dual-process model (Figures 2e and 2f ) additional quadratic regressions were calculatedo nt he z ROCf or each individual participant after each retention interval in Experiment 2.
3 None of the three mean quadratic components differed from 0( 0d ays ¼ 2 0.12, SE ¼ 0 : 09, t ð 23Þ¼2 0 : 22, p . : 05; 7d ays ¼ 2 0.13, SE ¼ 0 : 10, t ð 23Þ¼2 1 : 20, p . : 05; and 14 days ¼ 2 0.07, SE ¼ 0 : 11, t ð 23Þ¼2 0 : 69, p . : 05). This excludes the dual-process model as an explanation forthe patternofresults in Experiment 2; instead the unequalvariance form of the univariate signaldetection model is supported.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments reported here were designed to determine what can be inferred aboutt he process of recognition from the effects of retention intervals on subjective reports of remembering and of confidence.R etention intervals are an intuitively appealinga nd methodologicallyu seful means to examiner ecognition since it is well known that memorydeclines over time, and moreover,the phenomenal experience of memoryalso seems to change. If one assumes that phenomenology reflectsprocess then one might infer that differentkinds of memorydeclineorare forgotten at differentrates.
There have been afew previous studies of this sort. For example, Gardiner and Java (1991) , Knowlton and Squire (1995) and Tulving (1985) all reported experiments in which subjective reportsofremembering and knowing changed over time. Both Tulving (1985) a nd Gardiner and Java (1991) found that subjective reports of remembering declined while reportsofknowing remained constant over retention intervals measured in days and weeks. By contrast,K nowlton and Squire( 1995) observedt hat reports of knowing increased over time as reports of remembering decreased. These findings have generallyb een interpreted as dissociations between underlying processeso f recollection and familiarity.A notherk ind of subjective reportt hat hasb een usedt o study these processes aresubjective reports of confidence. Confidence judgements are used to study the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity to recognition judgements by an analysis of the shape of ROCcurves. Since the two kinds of subjective reportare used to examinethe sameprocesses, it followsthat any variable that affects one should also affect the other.Although there have been many such studies,only two previous ones have examined the effects of retention intervals on the shapeo fR OC curves in recognition memory. Of these, one did not directly examinethe shape of the ROCc urvesb yt esting fort he quadratic component that the dual-process model requires (Wais et al.,2006) . The otherused non-word stimuli (Tunney&Bezzina, 2007) .
The two experiments reported here examined the effects of retention intervals on both kinds of subjective report.InExperiment 1, participants maderemember,know,or guess responses. The relative contribution of recollection to recognition wasmeasured as the proportions of remember responses. Thisshowed arapid decline after 7days but no further changebetween 7and 14 days. Familiarity, when measured as the proportion of know responses, showed aslight increase over this period (as reported by Knowlton &Squire,1995) ,but when the estimates of familiarity were adjusted forindependence (Yonelinas &Jacoby,1995) theyremained constant. Experiment 2examined the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity using ROCc urvesb ased on subjective reports of confidence. The contribution of recollection is indexed by the deviationo f the slope of the z ROCf rom 1. The patterno fc hangei nt he slope of the ROCc urves mirrored those of the remember-know judgements in Experiment 1. Immediately after study,there appeared to be alargecontribution of recollection, but this declined after 7days. Between 7and 14 daysthere was no further change. In both experiments, even after 14 days there was as ignificant contribution of recollection to the recognition judgements.I ns um, the data from bothk inds of measurement methoda ppear to providee vidence ford ifferent rates of forgetting in recollection and familiarity-based memory: recollection declinesrapidly while familiarity persists.
As econd, and perhapsm ore important, aim of this paper wast oa pply as et of criteria derived from the signaldetectionliterature to determine whether these changes in phenomenology do indeed reflect separate processes of recollectionand familiarity, or whether theyc an be attributed to au nivariate signald etection process. The univariate signald etection model assumes that remembering and knowing reflect responsec riteria and not separate decision or retrieval processes, although some interpretations of the model concede that the signalm ight be composed of different sources of information (Wixted,2007;  Figure 1 ). In this model, items varyalong asingle dimensions of memory' strength'.W hena skedt om akearecognition judgement, the participant sets acriterion, and any items that exceed the criterion are endorsed as old and those that fall shorta re rejected as new. When asked to makeasubjective report, the participant must set additional criteria to reflect the reportst heya re being asked to make. Items that are high in signals trengtha re reported as remember responses.
Thosethat are lower in strengthbut that nonethelessexceed the old-new criterionare reportedasknow responses. Donaldson (1996) arguedthat if the signal detection model is correct then estimates of sensitivity based on just remember responsesshould be just as accurate as those based on recognition overall. This prediction has been tested in a wide rangeofremember-know (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004) and remember-knowguess (Gardiner et al.,2 002) experiments using different measures of sensitivity (see Macmillan et al.,2005) . While the results using differentmeasures such as d 0 and A 0 have been contradictory, when applied to Experiment 1b othm easures supportt he univariate signal detectionmodel of remembering and knowing.
Asimilar suggestion is that if remember responses reflect criterionplacement, as is assumedbysignal detection models, thentheyshould be variable (Rotello et al., , 2006 Starns &Ratcliff, 2008; Wixted &Stretch, 2004) .Dual-process models requirethat remember responses do not varyw ith criterion placement, confidence, or signal strength. Previous experiments have tested this claim by asking participants to first make subjective reports of remembering and then to make confidence judgements.The results of these studiese ssentiallys how that remember judgements are often made at different levels of confidencet hat may overlap with confidence ratings assigned to know judgements. Moreover,v ariations in instructions designed to shift the participants'p lacement of the remember criterionc learly show that remember responses are subject to bias (e.g.R otello et al.,2 005, 2006; Starns &R atcliff, 2008; Wixted&Stretch, 2004) .Both of these findings are inconsistent with the dual-process theoryw hich predicts, because recollectioni sathreshold process,t hat remember responses should not be variable or subject to bias. Although the experiments reported here did not permit this direct comparison because confidencer atings and subjective reports of remembering were treated as between-subjects variables the data do show that the criterion placement ( c )for remember responses in Experiment 1became more conservative as the interval between study and test increased.
The data obtained in Experiment 2a lso appear at first to supportt he dual-process account of recognition in the sense that the symmetryo fR OC curves derived from confidenceratings appearstoincrease with time. The test of whether this effect is due to a more rapid decline in recollection relative to familiarity or to changes in the underlying signal and noise distributions is whether the slope of the regression through the z -transformed ROCc urvess howsaq uadratic component (Glanzer et al., 1 999) .T he presence of aq uadratic component discriminates between the unequal-variance and dual-process models. As such, if the increase in the symmetryo ft he z ROCo ver the retentionintervals were due to adecline in the contribution of recollection, thenthere should be ac orresponding decline in the quadratic component. There was no such component, indicating that the asymmetryi nR OC curvesc ould not be attributed to separate processes of recollection and familiarity.Insteadthe changes in asymmetryofthe z ROCare likely to be due to changes in the variance of the signal and noise distributions.
Finally, if the reports of remembering and knowing obtained in Experiment 1reflect criterion placement as predicted by the signald etection account then theya re little more than categorical labels forc onfidence judgements. If so then the reports of the experience of remembering can be treated as confidencejudgements and be plottedas ROCcurves. The results, shown in Figure 6 , closely match the ROCcurvesobtained for confidencej udgements,a nd suggest that the two kinds of response are predicated on the same information,namely memory' strength'.
In sum, the data reported here show that the phenomenal experience of remembering does indeed changeo vert ime. However,c lose inspection of how time affectst hese subjective reportsd oes not lend supportt ot he view that theya re predicated on separate processes. Rather,t he data of the precise form of forgetting all lend support to as imple, univariate signal-detection mechanism.
Recent years have seenacontinuation in the development of models of recognition memoryg enerally,a nd more specifically of subjective reports of remembering. For example, Rotello et al. (2004) propose ahybridmodel in which recognition judgements and subjective reports of remembering are based on two sources information: global and specificm emory strength. Recognition judgements are based on the sum of these two signals. Remember and know judgements are based on the difference between the two signals. Items that are high in specificmemory strengthare reported as remember responses, while those that are high in global memory strengtha re reported as know responses. This model is persuasive, but nonetheless posits two separate sources of information on which decisions areb ased rather than one. DeCarlo (2007) presentsa conceptually similar model that is relevant to confidence ratings. This too assumes two signals. The data reported herecan be explained by asingle source of information. Erdfelder,Cü pper,Auer,and Undorf (2007) have developed acompletely differentclass of model in which subjective reports of remembering are described by am ultinomial tree model. Theyr eportt hat this model matches or outperformst he singles ignal detection model'sability to describe subjective reports of remembering. If so, then this model deserves greater attention. But as yet it is not sufficiently developed to account fors ubjective reports of confidence.W hile these new models show promise, there seems little reason to adopt more sophisticated models when the data can be readily explained by simple signald etection. The question is how as imple mechanism like signal detection gives rise to differences in phenomenal experience that we call recollection and familiarity.O ne view attempts to reconcile signal detention and dualprocess models by making the simple assumption that memorys trengthi sp redicated on an aggregate of differents ources that may include both recollection and familiarity (Wixted, 2007) . Nevertheless, this wayofviewing recollectionand familiarity is as part of as ingled ecision process. The weight of evidence, to which these data add, is compelling in its supporto ft he univariate signald etection model.
